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Believing Epistemic Contradictions
Abstract
What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates
difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own
solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for
epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a
surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide
counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
1 The Puzzle
Ari the burglar has been casing the house for hours. As far as she can tell, not a mouse is
stirring. Consequently, Ari believes the house is empty.
Still, Ari is an experienced burglar; she knows that even the most thorough reconnais-
sance is fallible. Thus she allows that there’s some possibility—albeit very remote—that an
inconspicuous resident is still inside.
Given this, it seems we should be able to report Ari’s belief state as follows:
(1) # Ari believes the house is empty and might not be empty.
But (1) sounds odd. In uttering (1), it sounds like you’re attributing to Ari an inco-
herent belief.1 This is surprising, since nothing in our set-up seemed to saddle Ari with
incoherence. On the face of it, Ari is being perfectly rational: forming beliefs in response
to her evidence, without being overly confident in her conclusions.
We have here the makings of a puzzle, which can be formulated in more general terms.
It’s a sad but indisputable fact that humans are fallible: we’ve all held beliefs that turned
out to be mistaken. Recognizing this fact, it seems rational for an agent to hold some
belief, while also acknowledging that it’s possible that this belief is mistaken. At the very
least, it seems that this stance is coherent. Letting ‘⌃’ represent epistemic possibility, we can
formulate this principle as follows:
Fallibility It’s sometimes coherent for an agent to believe f and also believe ⌃¬f.
For example, Ari the burglar believes that the house is empty, while also believing that
there’s some possibility that someone is still inside.
1It’s important that both conjuncts of the complement clause (the house is empty and (it) might not be empty)
scope under believes. The sentence:
(i) Ari believes [the house is empty]; and it might not be empty.
does not ascribe to Ari an incoherent belief. We discuss versions of (i) in §3.
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While Fallibility seems plausible, our reaction to (1) motivates a principle that stands in
tension with it. Following Yalcin (2007), let us refer to any sentence of the form, f ^⌃¬f
as an epistemic contradiction. Given the oddity of (1), it’s tempting to maintain that it is
always incoherent to believe an epistemic contradiction:
No Contradictions It’s never coherent to believe (f ^⌃¬f).
But it is prima facie difficult to reconcile these two principles. Is any story about beliefs
involving epistemic modals up to the task?
2 Roadmap
Whenever we encounter two principles that stand in tension with each other, it is prudent to
examine whether the principles are really all that plausible. We thus start by defending our
principles: in §3, we argue that both are well-supported by linguistic data. Consequently
we should solve our puzzle not by denying one of our principles, but rather by providing
a semantics for epistemic modals and belief reports that validates both of them, thereby
dissolving the appearance of inconsistency.
This is no trivial task. The classical semantics for epistemic modals doesn’t deliver the
desired results: as we show in §4, standard contextualist (Kratzer 1981, 2012) and relativist
(Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007a,b; MacFarlane 2011) approaches to modals are forced to give
up either Fallibility or No Contradictions.
By itself, this may strike some as unsurprising. After all, Yalcin (2007, 2011) has argued
that the classical semantics has trouble explaining the infelicity of epistemic contradictions
in embedded contexts. However, we show that while leading non-classical accounts of
beliefs involving epistemic modals (Veltman 1996; Gillies 2001; Yalcin 2007, 2011, 2012a;
Willer 2013) validate No Contradictions, they invalidate Fallibility (§5). As a result, they
also fail to provide a satisfactory solution to our puzzle.
In §6 we present our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief
with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. According to our theory, A believes f
iff A assigns a sufficiently high credence to the result of updating A’s information with
f. Assuming a dynamic account of updating, this theory validates both of our principles,
thereby solving the puzzle. In broad outline, the solution is this. Our theory borrows from
Bayesianism the insight that belief requires sufficiently high credence, not certainty. At the
same time, the dynamic account of updating predicts that modal beliefs are ‘transparent’:
to believe that the house might not be empty is to be less than certain that it’s empty.
And so our theory predicts that whenever an agent believes f without being certain of
it, she counts as believing ⌃¬f, thereby validating Fallibility. However, the dynamic
account of updating also predicts that no body of information can coherently be updated
with f ^ ⌃¬f. Hence no coherent agent will believe an epistemic contradiction, thereby
validating No Contradictions.
After developing our solution to the puzzle, we defend and extend it. §7 explores a
surprising consequence of our account of belief: coherent agents can believe f and believe
⌃¬f, but they cannot coherently believe an obvious entailment of these beliefs: f ^⌃¬f.
Thus our solution entails that rational belief is not closed under logical implication. Indeed,
our view suggests that counterexamples to closure occur all the time—no need to look to
lotteries and prefaces. Finally, §8 defends our solution from objections.
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3 Defending our Principles
3.1 Fallibility
Let us start with Fallibility—the thesis that it’s sometimes coherent to believe f and to also
believe ⌃¬f. In addition to its intuitive plausibility, we offer three arguments in support of
this thesis.
The first is the argument from concessive belief attributions. Let a concessive belief
attribution (CBA) be a discourse of the form:
(2) I believe f. But ⌃¬f.
Such discourses seem perfectly felicitous. Consider, for instance:
(3) I believe the movie starts at 7, but
⇢
it might start later
I might be mistaken
 
.2
Presumably it is infelicitous to make an assertion if it is impossible for a coherent agent to
have a true belief in its content. But if Fallibility were false, no coherent agent could truly
believe a CBA. After all, suppose the first conjunct of a CBA (I believe f) is true. If Fallibility
were false, the second conjunct (But ⌃¬f) could not be coherently believed. More generally,
if Fallibility were false, then anyone who uttered a CBA would be committed to having
any incoherent doxastic state.
The second argument for Fallibility comes from considering discourses of the form:
(4) Ari believes the house is empty. But she realizes/recognizes that it might not be.
(4) sounds perfectly fine.3 But presumably if an agent realizes or recognizes f, it follows
that she believes f. So if Fallibility were false, (4) would be incoherent.
Our third argument for Fallibility is more theoretical. According to this argument,
Fallibility follows from two further principles, both of which are supported by independent
data. The first principle is that it’s coherent to hold uncertain beliefs:
Uncertain Belief It’s possible to coherently believe f without being certain that f.
The idea that belief doesn’t require certainty is widely taken for granted.4 It’s also
well-supported by our everyday belief and certainty talk. Some examples:
(5) I believe, but am not certain, that the land was granted to Mr. Baca for pasturing
purposes...5
(6) I believe but am not certain that Palestine is not a party to the statute of the
International Court of Justice, and I believe but am not certain that the General
Assembly has not addressed an invitation to Palestine to join the Convention.6
2Concessive knowledge attributions (that is, sentences of the form, I know f, but ⌃¬f) have attracted a
great deal of attention in recent years. Interestingly, while it’s frequently observed that concessive knowledge
attributions are infelicitous (see, e.g., Lewis 1996; Rysiew 2001; Stanley 2005; Dodd 2011; Worsnip 2015), the
comparative felicity of CBAs seems to have gone unnoticed.
3In a similar vein, Hawthorne et al. observe that it sounds coherent to say, I believe it’s raining, but I know it
might not be (2016: 1396).
4Though see Clarke (2013) and Dodd (forthcoming) for dissent.
5Executive Documents of the House of Representatives, vol.125-126: 40.
6https://lettersblogatory.com/2015/01/02/palestine-signs-new-york-convention/
3
This is the author manuscript of an article. 
The final published version is available at The Review of Symbolic Logic, Advance online publication (Aug 2017); doi: 10.1017/S1755020316000514 
ISSN 1755-0203 (Print) / 1755-0211 (Online) 
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017. Published online: 08 Aug 2017
Believing Epistemic Contradictions
Such utterances seem to express coherent doxastic states.7
While (5) and (6) are first-person attitude ascriptions, it is also natural to ascribe
uncertain beliefs to others. For example:
(7) Ari believes that the house is empty, but she’s not certain of it.
If Uncertain Belief were false, (7) would ascribe to Ari an incoherent doxastic state. But to
our ears, (7) seems perfectly coherent.
The second principle posits a connection between uncertainty and believing possible:
Uncertainty-Possibility Link If an agent A is coherent, then if A isn’t certain that f, A is
in a position to believe ⌃¬f.
We suspect that Uncertainty-Possibility Link will prove more controversial than Uncertain
Belief. A couple of clarificatory remarks may help forestall some immediate objections. First,
in order for the principle to be remotely plausible, it’s important that it is interpreted as
making a claim about epistemic possibility, rather than physical or metaphysical possibility.
Second, the ‘in a position’ qualification here is important. To see this, consider an agent who
is not certain that f, but has never even considered the question of whether f. Arguably, it
is at least somewhat counterintuitive to say that they believe that f might be false. Thus,
Uncertainty-Possibility Link should be interpreted as making the following claim: if a
coherent agent isn’t certain that f, they are committed to believing (perhaps on further
reflection) that it’s epistemically possible that f might be false.
Even with these clarifications, some may deem Uncertainty-Possibility Link implausible.
After all, it’s widely held that certainty is a very demanding state. For example, many
philosophers maintain that if one is certain of f, one should be willing to accept a bet
where one wins a penny if f is true, and one loses one’s life otherwise. Presumably, very
few of ordinary beliefs are held with this degree of conviction.8 But if for virtually any
ordinary proposition f, we do not believe f with certainty, Uncertainty-Possibility Link
entails that we are almost always in a position to believe ⌃¬f, and hence almost never in a
position to believe ¬⌃¬f.9 But this seems wrong. In ordinary contexts, it would be natural
for a speaker to say:
(8) Jim believes there’s no possibility the Lions will win.
even if she doesn’t think that Jim would bet his life on the claim that the Lions will lose.
However, proponents of Uncertainty-Possibility Link have a natural response. Observe
that in ordinary contexts, it would be equally natural for a speaker to say:
(9) Jim is certain that the Lions will lose.
This suggests that truth-values of certainty ascriptions differ from context to context, where
here the context could be either that of the speaker or that of the subject of ascription.10
7See Christensen (2005: 21) and Hawthorne et al. (2016: 1395) for similar observations.
8For the view that certainty is rarely (if ever) attained, see Russell (1912); Unger (1975), among others.
9Given the standard assumption that must (⇤) and might are duals (i.e., ⇤f iff ¬⌃¬f), this is equivalent to
saying that we are almost never in a position to believe ⇤f.
10See Lewis (1979: 353-354) and Stanley (2008). Note that if certainty ascriptions are context-sensitive, then it
would be more accurate to formulate Uncertainty-Possibility Link in the formal mode: if A isn’t certain that f is
true in a context, then A is in a position to believe ⌃¬f will also be true in that context.
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According to this view, only in the most demanding contexts will a claim of the form, A is
certain that f entail that A is willing to bet their life on f. In most ordinary contexts, less is
required.11
Indeed, reflecting on the assertability conditions of certainty ascriptions provides a
compelling argument for Uncertainty-Possibility Link. Consider:
(10) a. Ari isn’t certain that the house is empty.
b. ?? But she doesn’t believe/think there’s any possibility there’s someone inside.
Assuming we’re in a context in which Ari has considered the question of whether the
house is empty, following (10a) with (10b) sounds very odd. Uncertainty-Possibility Link
explains this: (10) ascribes an incoherent doxastic state to Ari.12
Thus, both Uncertain Belief and Uncertainty-Possibility Link are well-supported by the
data. And their conjunction entails Fallibility. After all, by Uncertain Belief it’s coherent for
an agent to believe f without being certain of f. By Uncertainty-Possibility Link, such an
agent will always be in a position to believe ⌃¬f. A fortiori, it will sometimes be coherent
for an agent to believe both f and ⌃¬f, as Fallibility maintains.
We have presented three arguments for Fallibility: the argument from CBAs, the
argument from the realize-belief entailment, and the argument from the conjunction of
Uncertain Belief and Uncertainty-Possibility Link. Of course, not all readers will be fully
persuaded by these arguments; we will discuss some objections to Fallibility in §8. But for
now, we propose to accept Fallibility as a working hypothesis.
3.2 No Contradictions
Turn now to No Contradictions. We’ve already provided the main argument for this
principle: (1) (Ari believes the house is empty and might not be empty) seems to ascribe an
incoherent doxastic state to Ari. What’s more, nothing hinges on the details of the example.
As far as we can tell, every instance of the schema:
(11) # A believes (f ^⌃¬f).
seems to ascribe incoherent beliefs to A.
We can strengthen the case for No Contradictions by observing that the oddity of (11)
is not an isolated phenomenon. Epistemic contradictions sound incoherent in a variety of
contexts. It’s often been noted that assertions of unembedded epistemic contradictions
sound bizarre:
(12) # The house is empty and might not be empty.13
11Some authors will resist the conclusion that certainty attributions are context-sensitive. These authors will
insist that the speaker’s utterance of (9) is “loose talk”: false but pragmatically acceptable (Unger 1975; Lasersohn
1999; Kennedy 2007.) Positing such rampant falsity in ordinary conversation strikes us as a cost to such a
view. That said, the “loose talk” approach is still compatible with Uncertainty-Possibility Link, provided it is
reformulated in terms of assertability conditions: if A isn’t certain that f is assertable in a context, then A is in a
position to believe ⌃¬f will also be assertable in that context.
12One potential complication for this argument is that believes is neg-raising, and so perhaps the logical form
of A doesn’t believe f is really, A believes ¬f. To control for this, one can rewrite the sentence with the quantifier,
nobody. To our ears, Nobody is certain that the house is empty, but nobody thinks there’s any possibility there’s someone
inside is equally marked.
13See Veltman (1996); Gillies (2001); Yalcin (2007, 2011); Willer (2013).
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Various authors have also noted that epistemic contradictions sound odd in the an-
tecedents of indicative conditionals, as well as under other attitude verbs—for instance,
suppose and imagine (Yalcin 2007, 2011; Anand and Hacquard 2013; Dorr and Hawthorne
2013). This suggests that there is a genuine and general phenomenon here.14
Some readers may be inclined to concede instances of (11) are infelicitous, but doubt that
this is best explained by the hypothesis that (11) ascribes incoherent beliefs to agents. But
then what explains the infelicity of (11), if not the incoherence of the underlying doxastic
state? Providing an explanation is no easy matter. Indeed, the puzzle can be reframed in a
way that relies directly on our linguistic judgments, rather than No Contradictions. What
account of beliefs involving epistemic modals will validate Fallibility, while also explaining
the infelicity of (11)?
Having motivated our two principles, we now turn to consider whether any account of
beliefs involving epistemic modals can validate both of them.
4 Troubles for the Classical Semantics
Orthodoxy has it that modals quantify over possibilities (Kratzer 1981, 2012). But they don’t
quantify over just any possibilities. Their domain is restricted by a contextually determined
set of worlds: the modal base. Possibility modals (e.g., might) existentially quantify over the
modal base; necessity modals (e.g., must) universally quantify over it. Let c be a context,
w an index, JfKc the set of indices w such that f is true at hc,wi, and Bc,w the modal base
determined by c and w. Contextualists propose:
Contextualist Might J⌃fKc,w = 1 iff Bc,w \ JfKc 6= ∆.
Epistemic modals are evaluated using an epistemic modal base: a set of worlds reflecting
the epistemic state of some contextually determined agents. Thus:
(13) The house might not be empty.
is true iff the proposition hThe house is not emptyi is compatible with the epistemic state
of the contextually determined group.15
Standard relativist accounts of epistemic modals (Egan 2007, Stephenson 2007a,b;
MacFarlane 2011) are similar. Their main point of departure is that they take the epistemic
modal base to reflect the epistemic state of an assessor—an individual who is interpreting
the modal. Let a be a context of assessment and Bc,a the c, a-determined modal base.
Relativists propose:
Relativist Might J⌃fKc,w,a = 1 iff Bc,a \ JfKc 6= ∆.
This allows that an utterance of (13) could be true relative to one context of assessment
(where the relevant folks’ epistemic state leaves open the possibility that the house is
14Note that both embedded and unembedded epistemic contradictions remain infelicitous when a contrast
marker such as but is used. For instance, Ari believes the house is empty but might not be is quite bizarre (even if it is
slightly less bizarre than (1)).
15Our exposition makes a standard simplification by omitting the role that the ordering source plays in most
versions of a Kratzerian semantics. We also omit the fact that some take epistemic modals to convey indirectness
(see e.g., von Fintel and Gillies 2010).
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occupied), and false relative to a different context of assessment (where the relevant folks’
epistemic state entails the house is empty).
In order for the classical semantics to generate predictions about our puzzle, we need
to say more about the nature of the epistemic modal base. In what follows, we look at the
two most natural options: the knowledge-based approach and the belief-based approach. We
argue that neither validates both of our principles; hence neither provides a satisfactory
resolution to our puzzle.
According to the knowledge-based approach, an epistemic modal base is the set of
possibilities compatible with what the relevant agents know, or can come to know (Hacking
1967; Kratzer 1981, 2012; DeRose 1991; Egan et al. 2005; Stanley 2005; Stephenson 2007a;
Hawthorne 2007, 2012; Egan and Weatherson 2011). On this approach, if A believes
(f ^⌃¬f), then what A believes is equivalent to:
(14) f and (¬f is compatible with what the relevant agents know).
But why would this be incoherent? Suppose A is the only relevant agent. Since
belief doesn’t entail knowledge, A could believe f without knowing f. What’s more,
A could truly believe she’s in such a position—that is, she could truly believe that she
believes f without knowing f.16 Thus the knowledge-based approach fails to predict No
Contradictions.
Some might think that this is too quick. Perhaps even though a subject can believe f
while failing to know f, no subject can coherently take herself to believe f while failing to
know f. One way of motivating this would be to appeal to the idea that knowledge is the
norm of belief (Williamson 2000: 47; Sutton 2005, 2007; Bird 2007; Huemer 2007).17
But we find this strategy unconvincing. There are certainly agents who take themselves
to hold beliefs that don’t amount to knowledge. Consider Thelma the theist, who professes
to believe that God exists, while also claiming that she doesn’t know that God exists: it’s a
matter of faith. Or consider Louise the lottery ticket holder, who believes her lottery ticket
will lose (on statistical grounds), but also claims not to know it will lose, on the grounds
that knowledge requires safety (McGlynn 2013). It’s natural to describe their doxastic states
thus:
(15) X Thelma believes that God exists and that she doesn’t know God exists.
(16) X Louise believes that her ticket will lose and that she doesn’t know her ticket will
lose.
But the knowledge-based approach predicts that (15) and (16) are equivalent to:
(17) # Thelma believes God exists and might not exist.
(18) # Louise believes her ticket will lose and might win.
So the knowledge-based approach does not explain the difference in felicity between these
pairs of sentences.18
16If there are relevant agents besides A, we expect cases in which one can truly believe an epistemic contradiction
to be even more common: they’ll include any case in which A believes f and also believes that the other relevant
folks don’t know f.
17In a similar vein, Dorr and Hawthorne (2013: 910, n.60) suggest that some uses of believes implicate that the
believer believes that she knows the complement clause.
18While our main criticism of the knowledge-based approach is that it doesn’t validate No Contradictions,
it’s also unclear whether it validates Uncertainty-Possibility Link. The only way that the knowledge-based
7
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Given these difficulties for the knowledge-based approach, one might adopt a belief-
based approach, according to which an epistemic modal base is the set of possibilities
compatible with what the relevant agents believe. This approach is in a better position to
capture No Contradictions. According to the belief-based approach, if A believes (f^⌃¬f),
then what A believes is equivalent to a conjunction of the form:
(19) f and (¬f is compatible with what the relevant agents believe).
If we assume that the relevant folks typically include A, this entails that A is committed to
believing a Moore-paradoxical proposition:
(20) f and I don’t believe f.
It’s a familiar observation that such Moorean beliefs seem incoherent. And so the incoher-
ence of believing an epistemic contradiction is explained in terms of the incoherence of
Moorean belief.19
However, giving this explanation of No Contradictions requires giving up Fallibility.
Here’s why. Suppose Fallibility holds, and hence that there’s a coherent agent who believes
f and also believes ⌃¬f. For concreteness, let’s focus on Ari, who believes the house is
empty, but also believes the house might not be empty. Given the belief-based approach, it
follows that Ari believes that it’s compatible with what she believes that the house isn’t
empty. And so Ari is committed to having a Moorean belief: hThe house is empty and
I don’t believe the house is emptyi. But then Ari is just as incoherent as someone who
believes an epistemic contradiction. Thus the belief-based approach only vindicates No
Contradictions at the expense of giving up Fallibility.
At this point, some may question the way we have argued against the classical seman-
tics. We’ve been assuming that the epistemic modal base is either the set of possibilities
compatible with what the relevant agents know or the set of possibilities compatible with
what the relevant agents believe. But why assume that there is a context-invariant answer
to this question? In some contexts it may be the former, in others, the latter. And perhaps
sometimes it’s simply indeterminate.20
While this seems reasonable, it doesn’t help the classical semantics evade our challenge.
After all, one candidate for the epistemic modal base is the set of possibilities compatible
with what the relevant agents know. This predicts that there should be coherent readings
of belief reports embedding epistemic contradictions. That is, there should be an available
reading of (15) on which it’s equivalent to (17), and an available reading of (16) on which
it’s equivalent to (18). Indeed, we’d expect listeners to converge on this reading, due
to general principles of charity. However, as we have seen, there’s no readily available
coherent reading of belief reports embedding epistemic contradictions. Those who leave it
to context to determine the epistemic state in question will have trouble explaining this
observation.
approach could validate this principle is if knowing f entails being in a position to be certain that f. While some
authors endorse this entailment (Ayer 1936; Moore 1959; Unger 1975), cases such as Radford’s (1966) unconfident
examinee provide grounds for doubt. Intuitively, the examinee knows the answer to the examiner’s question,
even though he isn’t in a position to be certain of it (Armstrong 1973; Stanley 2008; McGlynn 2014).
19By now there is a large literature on why such Moorean beliefs are absurd. For discussion, see Hintikka
(1962); Williams (1994); de Almeida (2001); Green and Williams (2007); Holliday and Icard (2010), among many
others.
20This proposal would fit naturally with ‘flexible contextualism’ (Dowell 2011), according to which the
community of relevant agents varies with the context of utterance.
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5 Troubles for Non-Classical Semantics
For some readers, it may come as no surprise that the classical semantics has trouble
explaining the infelicity of epistemic contradictions in belief reports. Yalcin (2007, 2011)
has shown that epistemic contradictions are infelicitous when embedded under various
operators, which poses a problem for the classical semantics. Compare:
(21) # Suppose it’s raining and it might not be raining.
(22) X Suppose it’s raining and I don’t know [/believe] it’s raining.
One might hope for a unified treatment of epistemic contradictions in embedded contexts:
whatever explains the infelicity of (21) also explains the infelicity of (1).
Indeed, a variety of non-classical semantics for might explain the infelicity of epistemic
contradictions in embedded contexts. In doing so, they validate No Contradictions.
However, we show that these theories are forced to deny Fallibility. For reasons of space,
we focus on one implementation of a non-classical semantics for might: a version of the
update semantics discussed in Veltman (1996); Gillies (2001); Yalcin (2012a,b); and Willer
(2013). However, the problem we raise generalizes to other non-classical semantics, such as
the static semantics developed by Yalcin (2007, 2011) and Moss (2015).
Update semantics is a type of dynamic semantics. In a dynamic semantics, the meaning
of an expression is not its truth conditions. Rather, the meaning of an expression is its
context change potential. This ccp is a function that takes as input a context and returns
the result of updating that context with the expression. In a slogan: the meaning of an
expression is its ability to change a body of information.21
Consider a language L containing a set of atomic sentences {a1, ..., an} closed under
might (⌃), and (^), and not (¬). Let a possible world w be a function from atomic sentences
to truth values. Let a context s be a set of possible worlds. According to update semantics,
the interpretation of L is a function [·] from sentences in L to ccps, functions from
contexts to contexts, defined recursively as follows:
Update Semantics
1. s[a] = s \ {w | w(a) = 1}
2. s[f ^ y] = s[f][y]
3. s[¬f] = s  s[f]
4. s[⌃f] = {w 2 s | s[f] 6= ∆}.
According to this semantics, an atomic sentence narrows down a context to the worlds
where it is true. A conjunction affects the context in two steps: first, it updates the context
with the first conjunct; next, the resulting context is updated with the second conjunct. The
negation of a sentence f updates the context with the ¬f worlds.
These first three clauses are updates: they affect the context by narrowing down the
possible worlds in it. By contrast, might is a test. Rather than narrowing down the worlds in
a context, ⌃f checks whether the context is compatible with f. For example, (13) (The house
21For important contributions to the dynamic tradition, see Stalnaker (1973); Karttunen (1974); Heim (1982,
1983); Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990, 1991a).
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might not be empty) will leave the context unchanged provided there’s at least one world in
the context where the house isn’t empty. Otherwise, the context crashes (represented as
the empty set of worlds ∆).
This semantics predicts that unembedded epistemic contradictions are infelicitous
(Veltman 1996; Gillies 2001). To see this, let us first define a notion of inconsistency for
Update Semantics. A sentence f is inconsistent just in case updating with f is guaranteed
to crash any context:
Consistency A sentence f is consistent iff 9s: s[f] 6= ∆; otherwise f is inconsistent.
It is easy to show that epistemic contradictions are inconsistent in Update Semantics:
Fact 1 (Epistemic Contradictions are Inconsistent)
For any descriptive (non-modal) sentence f and any context s: s[f ^⌃¬f] = ∆.
Proof: Let s be an arbitrary context and f an arbitrary descriptive sentence. By Update
Semantics, s[f ^ ⌃¬f] = s[f][⌃¬f]. Now s[f] is guaranteed to only contain f worlds.
Hence this set will always fail the test performed by ⌃¬f. So s[f ^⌃¬f] = ∆.
To illustrate with an example, take (12): The house is empty and it might not be empty.
Suppose our context s contains three worlds: w and u, in which the house is empty, and v,
in which the house isn’t empty. The first conjunct (The house is empty) narrows the context
down to worlds where the house is empty, giving us {w, u}. The second conjunct then
tests to see whether this updated context contains any worlds where the house isn’t empty.
Since the updated context fails this test, the sentence crashes. (See Figure 1.)
w u
v
s
w u
s[f] s[f][⌃¬f]
f
¬f
Figure 1: Updating with f ^⌃¬f
However, thus far Update Semantics doesn’t make any predictions about our puzzle,
because it lacks a semantics for believes. Let’s now enrich L with a believes operator (BA).
The standard dynamic semantics for believes analyzes belief in terms of support, where
support is defined as a fixed point:
Support A context s supports f (s |= f) iff s[f] = s.
On this definition, a context supports a sentence iff updating the context with that
sentence has no effect on the context. According to the standard dynamic view, an agent
believes f iff her doxastic state supports f.22 More precisely, suppose that an agent A’s
22This account was first proposed by Hans Kamp, and is defended in Heim (1992); Zeevat (1992); Yalcin
(2012a,b); Willer (2013).
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doxastic state at a world w is characterized by a set of worlds (swA): these are the worlds
consistent with what A believes at w. Then:
Belief as Support s[BAf] = s \ {w | swA |= f}.
To illustrate, consider:
(23) Ari believes the house is empty.
According to Belief as Support, (23) narrows down a context to those worlds where Ari’s
doxastic state supports the house is empty, which in turn obtains iff there is no world in her
doxastic state in which the house is occupied.
This approach has the advantage of validating No Contradictions. By Fact 1, epistemic
contradictions are semantically inconsistent. And so no non-empty set of worlds supports
an epistemic contradiction. A fortiori, no coherent agent’s doxastic state supports an
epistemic contradiction. By Belief as Support, it follows that no coherent agent believes an
epistemic contradiction.23
Unfortunately, Belief as Support invalidates Fallibility. To see this, consider:
(24) Ari believes the house might not be empty.
Given Update Semantics and Belief as Support, (24) updates the context with the infor-
mation that Ari’s doxastic state contains at least one world where the house is occupied.
But this means that (23) is false. More generally, BAf and BA⌃¬f provide incompatible
instructions for updating the context. Thus Update Semantics, when combined with Belief
as Support, forces us to abandon Fallibility.24
Let’s take stock. We’ve argued that the leading accounts of what it is to believe that
something might be the case fail to satisfactorily resolve our puzzle. Specifically, we’ve
canvassed two versions of a classical semantics for epistemic modals (the knowledge-based
approach and the belief-based approach) as well as a standard dynamic approach (Update
Semantics conjoined with Belief as Support). The knowledge-based approach failed to
validate No Contradictions, whereas both the belief-based approach and the dynamic
approach invalidated Fallibility.
23This strategy generalizes smoothly to explain the infelicity of epistemic contradictions under other attitude
verbs. Take supposes. Update Semanticists can hold that A supposes f narrows down the context to those worlds
where A’s suppositional state supports f. More precisely, let supwA be the worlds compatible with what A
supposes at w. Letting SuA abbreviate A supposes, Update Semanticists can propose:
Supposes as Support s[SuAf] = s \ {w | supwA |= f}.
Since no set of worlds supports an epistemic contradiction, epistemic contradictions cannot be supposed: (21) is
always false. (Cf. the static treatment of supposes in Yalcin 2007.)
24Other non-classical semantics for epistemic modals, such as those developed by Yalcin (2007, 2011) and Moss
(2015), arrive at much the same impasse. For example, Yalcin (2007, 2011) relativizes the truth conditions of
sentences to both a world w and an information state s. (As in Update Semantics, s is a set of worlds.) On Yalcin’s
semantics, ⌃f is true at some w, s iff s contains at least one world where f is true. Yalcin combines this with
a semantics for belief reports according to which believes shifts the information state to the believer’s doxastic
alternatives: BAf is true at some w, s iff for every world w0 in swA, f is true at w0, swA. This predicts that (23) and
(24) have incompatible truth conditions: (23) is true iff the house is empty at every world in Ari’s doxastic state,
and (24) is true iff the house is occupied at some world in Ari’s doxastic state. So, much like Belief as Support,
Yalcin’s (2007, 2011) treatment of modal beliefs invalidates Fallibility.
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Is there an alternative approach that can validate both Fallibility and No Contradictions?
We think so. In what follows we present our own solution, which integrates Update
Semantics with a Bayesian account of belief. We show that this position is able to validate
all of our principles, thereby resolving the puzzle.
6 A New Semantics for Belief Reports
Here, in a nutshell, is our proposal: an agent believes f iff she assigns a sufficiently high credence
to the result of updating her information with f. This proposal offers a way of synthesizing
Update Semantics with a ‘Lockean’ approach to belief, according to which believing f
amounts to having a credence in f that exceeds some threshold.25 The resulting synthesis
combines the primary advantages of both approaches, thereby resolving our puzzle. From
Update Semantics, we borrow the resources to validate both No Contradictions and
Uncertainty-Possibility Link. From the Lockean view, we borrow the resources to validate
Uncertain Belief. And by validating both Uncertainty-Possibility Link and Uncertain Belief,
we thereby validate Fallibility.
To introduce the details of our proposal, it may help to start with a simple version of
the Lockean view, according to which A believes f iff A assigns a sufficiently high credence
to the set of f worlds. Let J·K assign to each descriptive sentence of the language the set of
worlds where it is true. Let PrA be A’s credence function, and let t denote some threshold
between 0 and 1. Lockeans propose:
Lockean Belief JBAfKw = 1 iff PrA(JfK) > t.
That is, BAf is true iff A assigns a credence greater than t to the set of worlds where f is
true.
While we’ll argue shortly that Lockean Belief requires revision, the basic idea behind
the Lockean approach holds considerable appeal. Unlike Belief as Support, Lockean Belief
sheds light on the connection between outright belief and degrees of belief. In particular, it
validates plausible inference patterns linking these two notions, for instance:
(25) a. Fred believes it’s raining. )
b. Fred is fairly [/quite] confident that it’s raining.
In addition, Lockean Belief validates Uncertain Belief. After all, it’s coherent to have a high
credence in f without being certain that f. According to Lockean Belief, a high credence is
all that’s required for belief.
Despite its attractions, Lockean Belief does not solve our puzzle. Taken by itself, it
does not validate either Fallibility or No Contradictions. Indeed, taken by itself, it is not
clear how it accounts for beliefs about what might be the case. This lacuna is particularly
evident if we adopt the dynamic approach to epistemic modals from §5. After all, on the
dynamic approach there is no set of worlds where ⌃f is true. Thus the task that now faces
us is to extend Lockean Belief to modal beliefs in a way that validates our two principles.
To do this, we propose a dynamic twist to Lockean Belief. On a dynamic approach,
while there is no set of worlds in which ⌃f is true, updating any particular set of worlds s
with ⌃f will always result a set of worlds (either s or ∆). Thus to capture modal beliefs,
25For defenses of the Lockean view, see Foley (1993); Christensen (2005); Sturgeon (2008).
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we propose an updated Lockean thesis: for A to believe f is to assign a high credence
to the result of updating A’s doxastic state with f. Intuitively, we can think of updating
with one’s doxastic state with f as a way of modeling becoming certain of f. Given this
gloss, our proposal amounts to the following. A believes f iff A assigns a sufficiently high
credence to the doxastic state that would result from becoming certain of f.
In order to implement this, we model an agent A’s doxastic state at w with two
components—a set of worlds swA, and a probability function Pr
w
A. s
w
A is the set of worlds
compatible with what A is certain of at w. As in Lockean Belief, PrwA is an agent’s credence
function at w. It assigns swA a probability of 1. We model the result of updating A’s
information at w with f as swA[f], where [·] is defined as in Update Semantics. We propose
that an agent believes f iff she assigns a sufficiently high credence to this set of worlds
(swA[f]). And so updating a context with BAf narrows down that context to the worlds
where A’s credence function meets this condition. More precisely:
Locke Updated s[BAf] = s \ {w | PrwA(swA[f]) > t}.
Let’s unpack this. According to Locke Updated, BAf updates a context with the worlds
where A believes f. Which worlds are these? The worlds where A has a sufficiently high
credence in swA[f]. Here s
w
A[f] represents the doxastic state that A would be in, if A were to
become certain of f.26
We now show how this semantics resolves our puzzle. To do this, we first show that
our semantics validates both Uncertain Belief and Uncertainty-Possibility Link, thereby
validating Fallibility. We next show that our semantics validates No Contradictions.
Start with Uncertain Belief. To see that Locke Updated validates this principle, note
that Locke Updated agrees with Lockean Belief when it comes to descriptive beliefs. If f is
descriptive, then to believe f is to assign a sufficiently high credence to the f worlds:
Fact 2 (Descriptive Beliefs Are Lockean)
For any agent A and any descriptive sentence f: s[BAf] = s \ {w | PrwA(JfK) > t}.
Proof: By Locke Updated, BAf holds at a world w iff A’s credence in swA[f] exceeds t. To
find swA[f], we take the set of worlds in A’s doxastic state at w (s
w
A) and update this set with
f. By Update Semantics, when f is descriptive, this is simply the result of intersecting swA
with the f worlds (swA \ JfK). Since every agent assigns credence 1 to the set of worlds in
her doxastic state, her credence in JfK will equal her credence in swA[f].
From Fact 2, it’s a short step to Uncertain Belief. On a simple and quite natural view,
an agent is certain of f just in case her doxastic state supports f. This in turn entails that
her credence in f is 1. Let CA be an operator short for A is certain that. This gives us the
following:
Certainty as Support s[CAf] = s \ {w | swA |= f}.27
26Locke Updated can be complicated in various ways. For example, one could also allow the threshold to
vary with the context of utterance and/or the believer’s practical interests (Weatherson 2005, 2012; Ganson 2008;
Fantl and McGrath 2009). One could also make believes sensitive to a question under consideration (Yalcin 2011,
forthcoming). For our purposes, we set these complications aside, since they are not directly relevant to our
puzzle.
27In §3.1, we suggested that the truth-value of a certainty ascription depends on the context (either that of the
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Thus, on Locke Updated, anyone whose credence in a descriptive claim f is greater than t
but less than 1 will count as believing f without being certain of it.
To apply our semantics, recall Ari, who believes the house is empty without being
certain of it. We model this by saying that, at every world in the context, Ari’s doxastic
state includes both worlds where the house is empty and worlds where it isn’t. To simplify,
suppose Ari’s doxastic state consists of just our three worlds from §5: w and u, in which
the house is empty, and v, in which there’s someone inside. Suppose that Ari assigns a
credence of .8 to {w, u} and a credence of .2 to {v}. Finally, suppose that t, the threshold
for belief, is .75. Given all of this, Locke Updated entails that (23) (repeated here as (26)) is
supported:
(26) Ari believes the house is empty.
After all, the result of updating Ari’s doxastic state with the house is empty is {w, u}, and
Ari’s credence in this proposition exceeds .75.
At the same time, our semantics for certain predicts that the following will update the
context to return the empty set:
(27) Ari is certain that the house is empty.
After all, Ari’s doxastic state includes a world where the house is not empty (v).
Let’s turn to Uncertainty-Possibility Link. To see that our semantics validates this
principle, note that while Locke Updated agrees with Lockean Belief when it comes to
descriptive beliefs, they diverge when it comes to beliefs about what might be the case. In
particular, Locke Updated agrees with Belief as Support that modal beliefs are ‘transparent’:
an agent believes ⌃f just in case her doxastic state contains a f world. Summarizing:
Fact 3 (Might Beliefs Are Transparent)
For any agent A and any descriptive sentence f: s[BA⌃f] = s \ {w | swA 6|= ¬f}.
Proof: By Locke Updated, A believes ⌃f at w just in case she gives sufficiently high credence
to swA[⌃f]. By Update Semantics, swA[⌃f] is either swA or ∆, depending on whether there is
a f world in swA. If there is, then s
w
A[⌃f] = swA, to which A assigns credence 1. Otherwise,
swA[⌃f] = ∆, to which A assigns credence 0. And so A believes ⌃f just in case her doxastic
state includes a f world.
Fact 3 and Certainty as Support entail Uncertainty-Possibility Link. Given Certainty as
Support, if A isn’t certain that f, then A’s doxastic state doesn’t support ¬f. And so, given
Fact 3, A believes ⌃f. To illustrate, let’s return to Ari. Since Ari isn’t certain that the house
is empty, her doxastic state contains a world where the house isn’t empty ({v}). From Fact
3, we derive that Ari believes the house might not be empty.
Because our semantics validates Uncertain Belief and Uncertainty-Possibility Link, it
validates Fallibility as an immediate corollary. According to our semantics, anytime an
agent believes f without being certain that f, she will also count as believing ⌃¬f. We
summarize Facts 2 and 3 in Figure 2, which illustrates the different constraints imposed by
being certain that f, believing f, and believing ⌃f.
conversation, or that of the subject of the certainty ascription). One way to implement this suggestion in the
present framework would be to let the subject’s doxastic alternatives vary with context, so that in high-stakes
contexts swA includes possibilities that are absent in low-stakes contexts. See Clarke (2013) for an account of belief
along much these lines.
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= 1
Being certain that f
> t
Believing f
> 0
Believing ⌃f
f
swA
Key
Figure 2: Locke Updated
Finally, our semantics validates No Contradictions:
Fact 4 (No Contradictions)
For any context s, agent A and any descriptive sentence f: s[BA(f ^⌃¬f)] = ∆.
Proof: By Locke Updated, A believes (f ^ ⌃¬f) at w iff A assigns a sufficiently high
credence to swA[f ^⌃¬f]. From Fact 1, we know that for any context s, s[f ^⌃¬f] = ∆. So
swA[f ^⌃¬f] = ∆. Consequently, PrwA(swA[f ^⌃¬f]) = 0.
Applied to our example, (1) (Ari believes the house is empty and might not be empty) is
true iff Ari assigns a sufficiently high credence to the result of updating her doxastic state
with the house is empty and might not be empty. This proposition is found by taking her
doxastic state ({w, u, v}) and updating it in two steps. First, we update it with the house is
empty, giving us {w, u}. Next, we update this set with the house might not be empty, which
requires checking whether {w, u} contains at least one world where the house isn’t empty.
Since there’s no such world in {w, u}, we get the empty set. Since coherent agents assign
credence 0 to the empty set, Ari cannot coherently believe that the house is empty and
might not be.
7 Against Closure
Our solution to the puzzle has a surprising consequence: rational belief is not closed under
logical implication.
Here’s an off-the-shelf formulation of a multi-premise closure principle:
Multi-Premise Closure (MPC) If (i) A is rational in believing premises f1...fn, (ii) f1...fn |=
y, and (iii) A competently infers y from these premises, then A’s resulting belief in y
is rational.28
Let f1 be the premise: the house is empty. Let f2 be the premise: the house might not
be empty. Let y be the conclusion: the house is empty and it might not be empty. On our
account, Ari can coherently (and presumably, rationally) believe f1 and f2, but it would be
incoherent (and hence irrational) for her to believe y on this basis. Indeed, this is not just
28Our formulation is based on Schechter (2013).
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an idiosyncratic feature of our semantics: any semantics that validates both Fallibility and
No Contradictions is forced to reject MPC.29
Of course, challenges to closure are nothing new: it’s well-known that lotteries (Kyburg
1961) and prefaces (Makinson 1965) cause trouble for MPC. But if we’re right, counterex-
amples to MPC are much more common than has been acknowledged. What our account
suggests is that anytime you believe something without being certain of it, there’s a coun-
terexample to MPC lurking. If—as seems plausible—relatively few of our beliefs count as
certain, this means that most of our beliefs furnish us with counterexamples to MPC.
Here is another way in which our counterexample to MPC is stronger than others.
While Bayesian theories of belief reject MPC, they accept a weaker principle (Adams 1966;
Edgington 1997; Sturgeon 2008). Say that an agent’s uncertainty in f is the difference
between 1 and her credence in f. So if an agent is certain that f, her uncertainty in f is 0.
And if an agent is certain that ¬f, then her uncertainty in f is 1. Bayesians accept:
Bayesian Closure (BC) If f1...fn |= y, then a rational agent’s uncertainty in y cannot be
greater than the sum of her uncertainty with respect to f1, f2, ..., and fn.
Our example is also a counterexample to BC. Since Ari’s credence in f1 (the house is
empty) is .8, her uncertainty with respect to f1 is .2. So Ari should be certain in f2 (the
house might not be empty), which means her degree of uncertainty with respect to f2 should
be 0. However, Ari should also be certain that y (the house is empty and it might not be empty)
is false. So Ari’s degree of uncertainty in y is 1, which exceeds the sum of her uncertainty
in the premises f1 (.2) and f2 (0).30
For those attracted to closure, it’s natural to try to restrict MPC so that it does not apply
to reasoning involving epistemic modals:
Restricted MPC If (i) f1...fn and y are descriptive, (ii) A is rational in believing f1...fn,
(iii) f1...fn |= y, and (iv) A competently infers y from these premises, then A’s
resulting belief in y is rational.
29Here, we make the assumption that f;⌃¬f |= f ^⌃¬f. This holds on standard dynamic notions of validity
such as ‘update-to-test’ and ‘test-to-test’ entailment (Veltman 1996).
30Our counterexample to MPC has affinities with a recent counterexample to single-premise closure developed
independently by Bledin and Lando (forthcoming). Bledin and Lando’s counterexample relies on what they
(following Yalcin 2007) refer to as “Łukasiewicz’s Principle":
Łukasiewicz’s Principle ¬f |= ¬⌃f
Proponents of non-classical semantics for epistemic modals often embrace a non-classical consequence relation
that validates Łukasiewicz’s Principle (Veltman 1996; Yalcin 2007). But, as Bledin and Lando observe, it’s not
rational to believe ¬⌃f on the basis of a belief in ¬f. For example, Ari rationally believes the house is empty. But
since she isn’t certain of this, it isn’t rational for her to believe that the house must be empty.
While both of our counterexamples involve epistemic modals, it is worth highlighting an important difference.
Unlike Bledin and Lando’s counterexample, our counterexample does not require embracing any non-classical
consequence relation, let alone one that validates Łukasiewicz’s Principle. All our counterexample requires is that
conjunction introduction is a valid form of argument. This difference is important, because it creates difficulty for
a potential response to Bledin and Lando’s counterexample: namely, to perform modus tollens, and reject any
semantics that validates Łukasiewicz’s Principle (Schulz 2010: 388). Our counterexample shows that in order
to preserve closure one would also have to reject conjunction introduction. Since conjunction introduction is
classically valid, we suspect that many would find such a rejection to be much more unpalatable.
Thus while our counterexample is strictly independent of Bledin and Lando’s, we take our counterexample to
complement theirs. Indeed, Locke Updated can explain why it’s not always rational to reason in accordance with
Łukasiewicz’s Principle: it’s only rational to believe ¬⌃f if one is certain that ¬f is true.
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Restricted MPC captures many of the intuitions that motivated closure in the first
place—in particular, the idea that deduction is a rational way of extending our beliefs. On
the picture that emerges, deduction is always a rational way of extending our beliefs about
what is the case, but it’s not always a rational way of extending our beliefs about what
might be the case.
Of course, validating Restricted MPC without invalidating Uncertain Belief is no easy
task. Locke Updated is not up to it. This is because Locke Updated, like Lockean Belief,
embraces the idea that belief only requires meeting some threshold less than 1. Notoriously,
any such Lockean approach stands in tension with even Restricted MPC.31
However, there are promising strategies for modifying the Lockean thesis to preserve
closure. For example, Leitgeb defends a ‘stability’ theory of belief, according to which
“Belief is determined by a proposition of resiliently or stably high subjective probability”
(2014: 145). The intuitive idea here is that in order to count as believing f, an agent’s
credence in f must remain sufficiently high even upon acquiring new information (within
certain limits). Leitgeb develops this idea in terms of a technical notion of ‘P-Stability’. Say
that a sentence f is P-stable relative to a probability function Pr iff Pr(JfK) remains higher
than 12 even after conditionalizing on any admissible claim. And say that y is admssible
(relative to f, Pr) iff y is consistent with f and JyK is assigned some non-zero probability
by Pr. That is, the set of P-stable sentences for Pr (P(Pr)) can be characterized as follows:
P-stability P(Pr) = {f | 8y 2 A (f, Pr): Pr(JfK | JyK) > 12},
where y 2 A (f, Pr) iff f;y 6|=?, and Pr(JyK) > 0.
(When f is descriptive, this is equivalent to saying that f is P-stable just in case every
world at which f is true is assigned a higher probability than the union of the worlds at
which f is false.)
As Leitgeb develops the stability theory, an agent believes f just in case f is entailed
by some P-stable claim y that she believes, and hence her credence in f is greater than or
equal to her credence in y.32 Leitgeb shows that, on such a view, an agent’s beliefs will be
closed under logical implication.
As stated, Leitgeb’s view is schematic. After all, a given credence function can generate
multiple P-stable sentences. And for every such P-stable sentence f, an agent’s credence
in JfK gives us a different candidate for the Lockean threshold. To convert Leitgeb’s view
into a semantics for believes, we can posit a contextually determined choice function f that,
given the agent’s set of P-stable propositions, selects one as the Lockean threshold.33 Those
attracted to this approach could modify Locke Updated as follows:
Locke Stabilized s[BAf] = s \ {w: PrwA(swA[f])   PrwA( f (P(PrwA))},
where f selects a unique member ofP(PrwA).
To illustrate, consider (23) (Ari believes the house is empty). According to Locke Stabilized,
this means that Ari’s credence in the result of updating her doxastic state with the claim
that the house is empty exceeds that of the f -selected P-stable proposition.
31However, Locke Updated does validate a restricted form of BC, according to which BC holds for descriptive
premises and conclusions.
32Technically, Leitgeb takes P-stability to be a property of propositions. However, since we are interested in
giving a semantics for belief reports that encompasses modal beliefs (which are not themselves characterized via
propositions), we take P-stability as a property of sentences.
33See Leitgeb (2013) for the view that f selects the strongest P-stable proposition.
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While this semantics validates Restricted MPC, it does not validate an unrestricted
closure principle: MPC will still fail when it comes to f and ⌃¬f. After all, on Locke
Stabilized (as on Locke Updated) an agent believes ⌃f iff f is compatible with her doxastic
state. In that case, swA[⌃f] = swA. And since PrwA(swA) = 1, PrwA(swA|JyK) = 1 for every y. But
f ^⌃¬f still crashes A’s doxastic state, and so she does not believe this.
For our purposes, we need not commit to a stability theory of belief. Perhaps the
reader prefers some other closure-preserving modification of a Lockean view. If so, we
should be able to import any such modification into our semantics for believes, thereby
preserving Restricted MPC. Or perhaps the right response to lotteries and paradoxes is to
abandon even restricted closure principles. For our purposes, the important point is that
beliefs involving epistemic modals provide strong grounds for abandoning (unrestricted)
MPC; we leave it as an open question whether our semantics for believes should validate
Restricted MPC (and, if so, how this validation is best achieved).
8 Objections
8.1 First Objection: Order Effects
While Update Semantics predicts the semantic inconsistency of epistemic contradictions, it
does not predict the semantic inconsistency of reversed epistemic contradictions, i.e., sentences
of the form:
(28) ⌃¬f ^ f
For example:
(29) ? The house might not be empty and it is empty.
To see this, recall our context s containing three worlds—w and u, in which the house is
empty, and v, in which it isn’t empty. Updating with the first conjunct of (29) (The house
might not be empty) leaves the context the same, while updating with the second conjunct
shrinks it down to {w, u}. So s[(29)] 6= ∆.
As a result, our solution to the puzzle does not predict that it’s incoherent to believe
reversed epistemic contradictions. That is, our semantics does not predict that instances of
the following are infelicitous:
(30) BA(⌃¬f ^ f)
To see this, suppose (as before) that Ari’s doxastic state is {w, u, v}. Then:
(31) ? Ari believes that the house might not be empty and (it) is empty.
is predicted to narrow down the context to those worlds in which Ari’s credence in {w, u}
exceeds the Lockean threshold.
Some may regard this as a problem for our approach. After all, (31) sounds fairly odd.
Thus some might insist that any adequate solution to our puzzle will explain not just the
incoherence of believing epistemic contradictions, but also the incoherence of believing
reversed epistemic contradictions.
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In response, we should first note that there is a delicate and—to our knowledge—currently
unresolved question as to what exactly the data are. Historically, many dynamic semanti-
cists have regarded it as a datum that discourse (32) is coherent, or at least less degraded
than (33):
(32) It might be raining. It isn’t raining.
(33) ? It isn’t raining. It might be raining.34
In a similar vein, Sorensen (2009) and Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) claim that reversing the
order of the conjuncts of an embedded epistemic contradiction tends to make the sentence
more acceptable. Others have questioned these judgments.35 Until this empirical issue is
investigated more fully, it’s not obvious whether the fact that our theory predicts that (30)
is consistent should be regarded as a vice or a virtue.
But suppose we set aside this question about the data and assume, at least for the sake
of argument, that reversed epistemic contradictions are typically judged infelicitous. Is
there any way of modifying Update Semantics to predict this? Note that while reversed
epistemic contradictions are semantically consistent, they do display a somewhat unusual
property: they are non-idempotent, where idempotence is defined as follows:
Idempotence A sentence f is idempotent iff for any context s, s[f] |= f.
To put it in intuitive terms: a sentence is idempotent just in case updating any context
with the sentence once achieves the same result as updating the context with the sentence
twice. To see that reversed epistemic contradictions are non-idempotent, consider again
our context s containing two f worlds (w and u) and a ¬f world (v). As we’ve seen,
s[⌃¬f ^ f] = {w, u}; however, s[⌃¬f ^ f][⌃¬f ^ f] = ∆. As Yalcin (2015) remarks, there
seems to be something odd about a sentence that behaves in this way: uttering it creates
a context that is “inhospitable for its own update” (502). Thus one option is to modify
Update Semantics to predict that non-idempotent sentences always crash the context.36
We do not wish to take a stand on whether Update Semantics should be modified in
this way. For our purposes, it suffices to observe that the present objection to our proposal
raises larger issues about whether Update Semantics should be modified in order to predict
that reversed epistemic contradictions are infelicitous. For those who think that some such
modification is required, a natural path is to locate the infelicity of reversed epistemic
contradictions in their non-idempotence.
8.2 Second Objection: Questioning Fallibility
According to Locke Updated, believing a conjunction is not equivalent to believing each
conjunct individually. In particular, while Locke Updated predicts that BA(f ^ ⌃¬f)
crashes, it doesn’t predict that (34) crashes:
34See, for example, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991b); Veltman (1996); Gillies (2001); von Fintel and Gillies
(2007).
35See, for example, Yalcin (2015).
36It is a delicate matter how best to formulate this modification. As Yalcin notes, some quantified non-
idempotent sentences seem to be felicitous, which suggests that a blanket ban on all non-idempotent sentences is
too strong. Drawing on Klinedinst and Rothschild (2015), Yalcin offers a weaker non-idempotence requirement
(‘Consecutive update idempotence’) that applies at the compositional semantic level. This weaker requirement
suffices to explain the infelicity of (31). (See Yalcin 2015: 503-504 for the details.)
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(34) BAf. BA⌃¬f.
Many find discourses like this at least somewhat odd. Consider, for instance:
(35) ? Ari believes the house is empty. She also believes it might not be empty.
Should we revise our semantics to make (35) inconsistent after all?
Here too there is a question about the data. While we agree that (35) is a bit peculiar, it
doesn’t sound to us as bad as (1). Informal polling suggests others agree: roughly half of
those we’ve surveyed judge (35) to be marked, while the other half judged it to be fine. By
contrast, the vast majority of respondents deem (1) infelicitous. This provides reason to
resist revising our semantics to predict that instances of (34) crash: an adequate solution to
the puzzle will capture the fact that (1) sounds worse than (35).
In addition to our scruples about the infelicity of (35), there are principled reasons to
resist revising our semantics to predict that instances of (34) crash. Any such revision
would require giving up Fallibility. But, as we have seen (§3.1), there are three independent
arguments for Fallibility. To review: there was the argument from the felicity of CBAs
(e.g., (3)); there was the argument from the felicity of variants of (i) involving realize and
recognize (e.g., (4)); finally, there was the theoretical argument, which derived Fallibility
from the conjunction of Uncertain Belief and Uncertainty-Possibility Link, both of which
were supported by independent data.
For ease of reference, (36) collects much of the relevant data in one place, showcasing
these three grades of modal infelicity:
(36) a. # A believes (f ^⌃¬f).
b. ? A believes f. A also believes ⌃¬f.
c. X A believes f. But A realizes ⌃¬f.
d. X I believe f. But ⌃¬f.
None of the views that we’ve considered predicts all of these judgments. However,
Locke Updated comes the closest. On the one hand, views that reject Fallibility (e.g., the
belief-based version of the classical semantics and Belief as Support) incorrectly predict
that all of these sentences are incoherent. On the other hand, the knowledge-based version
of the classical semantics doesn’t predict that any of these sentences are incoherent. Only
Locke Updated predicts both the infelicity of (36a) and the felicity of (36c)-(36d).
Still, our initial question remains: what explains why (35/36b) is at least somewhat odd?
We are not sure, but one hypothesis is that optional modal subordination is responsible.37
A modal is subordinated when it is evaluated relative to a range of possibilities controlled
by previous discourse. We propose that when we evaluate (35/36b), we tend to access
a reading that subordinates the modal might to the complement of the previous belief
report (the house is empty). On this reading, the modal is evaluated relative to a set of
worlds where the house is empty; consequently, the discourse crashes. While this reading
is available, it is not mandatory; there’s another reading of (35/36b) on which the modal is
not subordinated. On this reading, the discourse does not crash. We suspect the availability
of this unsubordinated reading explains why (35) is less odd than (1).
37For discussion of modal subordination, see Roberts (1989); Kibble (1995); van Rooij (2005). For evidence that
might gives rise to optional modal subordination, see Klecha (2012).
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This explanation leaves some questions unanswered. First, why do some speakers
prefer the subordinated reading over the unsubordinated reading? Second, why does
(4/36c) sound better than (35/36b)? We do not at present have fully developed answers
to these questions. We suspect that when a modal has two readings—one subordinated,
the other unsubordinated—the extent to which one reading will be preferred over the
other will be influenced by a variety of factors. Perhaps for some speakers subordinated
readings are the default—the readings they tend to latch onto in the absence of cues to
the contrary. But this default can be overridden. Tellingly, (4/36c) contains a contrast
marker (but); what’s more, this discourse sounds best when the contrast marker is given
prosodic focus. We suspect that this may override the default, biasing speakers towards
the unsubordinated reading.38 However, we will leave to future research the project of
developing a rigorous account of the factors that influence the extent to which the different
readings are preferred. What’s important for our purposes is that there are compelling
reasons to retain Fallibility. This suggests that the right response to (35/36b) is not to revise
Locke Updated, but rather to explain the oddity of these sentences via some pragmatic
mechanism.
8.3 Third Objection: Might Beliefs vs. Might Certainties
According to our view, an agent believes ⌃f iff f is compatible with her certainties. Given
Certainty as Support, an agent is certain that ⌃f under the exact same conditions. Thus
our proposal collapses believing f is possible and being certain that f is possible:
Fact 5 (Collapse)
For any context s, agent A and any descriptive sentence f: s[BA⌃f] = s[CA⌃f].
Proof: From Fact 2, s[BA⌃f] = s \ {w | swA 6|= ¬f}. By Certainty as Support and Update
Semantics, s[CA⌃f] = s \ {w | swA 6|= ¬f}. So s[BA⌃f] = s[CA⌃f].
This seems counterintuitive. Consider, for example, DeRose’s (1991) cancer case, in which
Jane’s husband John has undergone a test to determine whether he has cancer. A negative
result will mean that John definitely does not have cancer. A positive result does not
necessarily mean that John does have cancer; rather, it means that further tests have to be
run. It seems natural to describe Jane’s credal state as follows:
(37) Jane believes John might have cancer. But she isn’t certain he might have cancer.
One possible response is to claim that the modal in the second conjunct is not epistemic;
rather, it quantifiers over physical or metaphysical possibilities (Stephenson 2007b: 50).
However, some might regard this as ad hoc. At the very least, it doesn’t seem obvious that
the occurrence of might in the second conjunct is non-epistemic.
Perhaps a better response is to concede the counterexample and amend our semantics
for certainty ascriptions. Earlier we raised the possibility that there is a stability constraint
on belief. We could likewise impose a stability constraint on certainty. According to this
constraint, in order for A to be certain that f, A’s doxastic state must support f even once
38It’s well known that contrast—and coherence relations more generally—influence how we resolve ambiguous
sentences (Hobbs 1985; Kehler 2002). For discussion of how coherence relations influence the resolution of
epistemic modals in particular, see Asher and McCready (2007).
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it’s been updated with any admissible claim. As before, y is admissible iff y is consistent
with f and assigned some non-zero credence by A. That is:
Certainty Stabilized s[CAf] = s \ {w | 8y 2 A (f, PrwA): swA[y] |= f},
where y 2 A (f, PrwA) iff f;y 6|=? and PrwA(JyK) > 0.39
To see how this solves the present difficulty, let y be the claim that the test results are
negative. This is consistent with the claim that John might have cancer; Jane also assigns
this claim some non-zero credence. But if we update Jane’s doxastic state with y, the
resulting set contains no worlds in which John has cancer. And so the resulting set will fail
the test imposed by the sentence: John might have cancer. Thus Certainty Stabilized predicts
that the second sentence in (37) (She isn’t certain he might have cancer) is true, as desired.
Certainty Stabilized is a conservative extension of Certainty as Support. That is, the two
semantics make the same predictions whenever f is not a possibility claim. To see why, we
need to introduce some further terminology. A sentence f is persistent when any context
s that supports f will continue to support f once s is updated with more information
(Veltman 1996: 3):
Persistence f is persistent iff 8s 8y: if s |= f, then s[y] |= f.
In Update Semantics, any descriptive claim is persistent. After all, s supports some
descriptive claim f just in case f holds at every world in s. Whenever this obtains, f also
holds at any subset of s. By contrast, ⌃f is not persistent (Veltman 1996). After all, s |= ⌃f
as long as updating s with f doesn’t produce ∆. It is consistent with this that updating
certain subsets of s with f will produce ∆. For example, when s |= ⌃f we will not in
general have that s[¬f] |= ⌃f.
It turns out that whenever f is persistent, Certainty Stabilized agrees with Certainty as
Support. That is, assuming the semantics for CAf is provided by Certainty Stabilized, the
following holds:
Fact 6
For any agent A and any persistent sentence f:
s[CAf] = s \ {w | swA |= f}.
Proof: It suffices to show that if f is persistent, then swA |= f iff 8y 2 A (f, PrwA) : swA[y] |= f.
So suppose swA |= f. Then since f is persistent, 8y 2 A (f, PrwA) : swA[y] |= f. Similarly,
suppose that 8y 2 A (f, PrwA) : swA[y] |= f. Then since > 2 Af, swA |= f.
This last fact leads to an interesting prediction. While ⌃f is not persistent in Update
Semantics, ⇤f is.40 After all, s |= ⇤f just in case s |= f. If this holds, then by the
persistence of f we know that for any y : s[y] |= f, and hence that s[y] |= ⇤f. We’ve
seen that while ⌃f is not persistent, ⇤f is. Thus while Certainty Stabilized allows for a
distinction between belief and certainty about what might be the case, it doesn’t allow for
any distinction between belief and certainty about what must be the case. Interestingly, this
prediction appears to be born out by the data. Consider the variant of (37) that replaces
might with must:
39This corresponds to the claim that A is certain of f iff f is P1-stable, where f is P1-stable iff, for any sentence
y that is both consistent with f and assigned some non-zero by A, Pr(swA[f] | JyK = 1). For further discussion of
different levels of P-stability, see Leitgeb (forthcoming: appendix B).
40Here we assume that ⇤ is the dual of ⌃, and so s[⇤f] = {w 2 s | s |= f}.
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(38) ?? Jane believes John must have cancer. But she isn’t certain he must have cancer.
We find it much harder to access a true reading of (38) than (37). This is a surprising
observation—one that Certainty Stabilized elegantly explains.
9 Conclusion
Recent work on the semantics of epistemic modals has explored what sort of mental state
is involved in beliefs about epistemic possibility: what is it to believe that something
might be the case? In this paper, we’ve tried to make progress on this question. We began
by identifying two principles that should constrain any account of what’s involved in
believing that something might be the case. Taken together, these principles form a puzzle,
since they are—at first blush—difficult to reconcile. We went on to resolve this puzzle by
offering a new semantics for believes that integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a
dynamic semantics for modals.
While we have focused on belief, our approach extends to other attitudes. Say that an
attitude verb V is credal iff VAf entails that A assigns some credence to f. Many—perhaps
most—attitude verbs are credal: one cannot suspect, regret, fear, or hope the house is
empty if one is certain the house isn’t empty. A natural generalization of our semantics for
believes holds that for any credal attitude verb V, VAf entails that A assigns some credence
to the result of updating A’s doxastic state with f (i.e., PrwA(s
w
A[f]) > 0).
This proposal provides a general explanation of the oddity of epistemic contradictions
under credal attitude verbs:
(39) # Ari suspects/regrets/fears/hopes that [the house is empty and might not be].
After all, updating A’s doxastic state with an epistemic contradiction always returns the
empty set. Since A will—if coherent—always have credence 0 in the empty set, this explains
the incoherence of adopting any credal attitude towards an epistemic contradiction.41 Thus
the account of belief developed in this paper has repercussions for our understanding of a
broader class of attitudes.
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